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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
which certain statutes may prescribe. 4 Under circumstances similar to those pre-
sented above, the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law provides injunctive relief
but does not make provision for damages.5 Thus, the Court held that plaintiff did
not have a legal basis for his first cause of action. Section 535 of the Real Property
Law provides relief of treble damages for forcible entry or detainer. "Forcible"
has been defined as meaning with violence or a threat giving rise to fear of
imminent personal injury." No such forcible entry or detainer was correctly alleged
in this case. The Court did not decide whether a statutory tenant would come
within the protection of section 535, but held that even if one would, plaintiff
did not state a cause of action within 
it.
It appears that the Court has correctly applied the law. Nonetheless, plaintiff
would be justified in complaining of the result for he obviously suffered some
damage. However, since his only remedy is a statutory one, his complaint would
be correctly addressed to the Legislature.7
Breach Of Covenant Of Quiet Enjoyment
The covenant of quiet enjoyment has as its primary purpose the protection of
the lessee from lawful claims of third persons. It also is a promise by the lessor
that he himself will not interfere with the lessee's enjoyment of the property.8
However, interference with the lessee's possession under the power of eminent
domain does not constitute a breach of the lessor's covenant of quiet enjoyment
for the reason that parties in making the covenant were contemplating interference
by virtue of existing rights.' A covenant against eminent domain would be a
covenant not against an existing right but against a naked possibility.' 0 On the
other hand if the lessor's act brought about the interference by the public police
power, it has been held that this is a breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment
since this is interference by the lessor himself."
In Dolman v. United States Trust Company of New York,' 2 the lessor-
defendant, upon the initiative of the city agreed to give the city an option at a
certain price on any award to which defendant became entitled upon condemna-
4. Rosner v. Textile Binding and Trimming Co., 300 N.Y. 319, 90 N.E.2d 481
(1950); David v. Fayman, 298 N.Y. 669, 82 N.E.2d 404 (1948).
5. N.Y. EMERGENCY HOUSING RENT CONTROL LAW §8591.
6. Fults v. Munro, 202 N.Y. 34, 95 N.E. 23 (1911).
7. Marony v. Applegate, 266 App. Div. 412, 42 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1st Dep't 1943).
8. Mayor of New York v. Mabie, 3 Kern. 151 (N.Y. 1885); Sears Roebuck
& Co. v. 9th-31 Street Corporation, 274 N.Y. 388, 9 N.E.2d 20 (1937), motion for
rcargument denied, 274 N.Y. 636, 10 N.E.2d 589 (1937).
9. Kip v. New York & .H.R.Co., 22 Sickels 227 (N.Y. 1876); Corrigan v.
Chicago, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N.E. 746 (1893); Weeks v. Grace, 194 Mass. 296, 80 N.E. 220
(1907).
10. Ellis v. Welch, 6 Mass. 246 (1810).
11. Lindman v. May, 111 App. Div. 457, 97 N.Y. Supp. 821 (2d Dep't 1906).
12. 2 N.Y.2d 110, 157 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1956).
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tion, a process authorized by law.'3 The lessee of the property, in possession under
a lease containing a covenant of quiet enjoyment and a provision that in the event
of condemnation, the landlord could terminate the lease, brought suit against the
lessor on the grounds that the covenant had been breached. Plaintiff claims that
interference with his possession was due, not to governmental action, but to the
lessor's action which induced the city to acquire the property by condemnation.
The Court of Appeals held, however, that the act of the defendant did not bring
about the condemnation since the granting of the option was merely incidental to
a greater force, the sovereign power of condemnation. Thus the tenant lost his
possessory rights when the property was condemned and not when the option
was given.
Plaintiff contended and the lower courts14 found that since the lessor received
by condemnation under the option agreement the same sum as he would have
received by a sale of the property under a proposed contract which the defendant
and the city negotiated before the condemnation took place, defendant's act of
agreeing to the option procedure was used to avoid his lease with the plaintiff.
The dissent agreeing with this position cites Lindman v. May'0 as authority for its
point of view. In that case, it was held that the landlord had breached the covenant
of quiet enjoyment when the premises were condemned after the landlord had
been warned by the city that if he did not repair the premises, they would be
torn down. An opposite conclusion was reached in another case where it was held
that the landlord had not breached an obligation to the tenant upon condemnation
since the landlord had not covenanted to repair and thus his act was not the
moving force in bringing about the condemnation.10
Defendant's ignorance of the option process until informed of it by the
city, plaintiff's awareness of the negotiations between the city and the defendant,
and the presence of the condemnation provision in the lease indicating that both
parties considered and provided for such an event lead us to the conclusion that
any act of the defendant was merely incidental not only to the sovereign power
but to the lease agreement itself. Thus, the defendant did not use the option pro-
cedure to violate his agreement with the plaintiff.
The Court's decision has set an adequate criteria for future cases and allows
the Code of New York City to be given its full effect in this area.
13. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF Naw YORK §B15-30.0 (1939).
14. 143 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. 1955); 1 A.D.2d 809, 148 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1st Dep't
1956).
15. See note 11 supra.
16. Mellis v. Berman, 9 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1939)
